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Many policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions have at their core efforts to put a price on carbon
emissions.  Carbon pricing impacts households both by raising the cost of carbon intensive products
and by changing factor prices. A complete analysis requires taking both effects into account. The impact
of carbon pricing is determined by heterogeneity in household spending patterns across income groups
as well as heterogeneity in factor income patterns across income groups. It is also affected by precise
formulation of the policy (how is the revenue from carbon pricing distributed) as well as the treatment
of other government policies (e.g. the treatment of transfer payments). What is often neglected in analyses
of policy is the heterogeneity of impacts across households even within income or regional groups.
In this paper, we incorporate 15,588 households from the U.S. Consumer and Expenditure Survey
data as individual agents in a comparative-static general equilibrium framework. These households
are represented within the MIT USREP model, a detailed general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy.
In particular, we categorize households by full household income (factor income as well as transfer
income) and apply various measures of lifetime income to distinguish households that are temporarily
low-income (e.g., retired households drawing down their financial assets) from permanently low-income
households. We also provide detailed within-group distributional measures of burden impacts from
various policy scenarios.
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Carbon pricing, whether through a cap and trade system or a tax, can have widely varying
distributional impacts. Variation in impacts arises for three reasons. First, households differ in
how they spend their income. Carbon pricing will raise the price of carbon intensive commodities
and disproportionately impact those households who spend larger than average shares of their
income on these commodities. In a general equilibrium setting, carbon pricing also impacts factor
prices. Households which rely heavily on income from factors whose factor prices fall relative to
other factor prices will be adversely impacted. In the public ﬁnance literature on tax incidence,
the ﬁrst impact is referred to as a uses of income impact while the latter a sources of income
impact (see, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, for a discussion of incidence impacts).
Third, regional differences in the composition of energy sources affect the carbon content of
various commodities, most notably electricity.
In previous work, we have used a new general equilibrium simulation model of the U.S.
economy (the MIT USREP model) to explore distributional implications of various ways of
distributing allowances from a cap and trade system (Rausch et al., 2010b) and alternative
schemes for returning revenues from an auctioned cap and trade system or equivalently a carbon
tax (Rausch et al., 2010a). This paper is similar in spirit to Rausch et al. (2010a) but employs a
variant of the USREP model that endogenously incorporates 15,588 households as individual
agents within a general equilibrium framework. This allows us to explore distributional impacts
of carbon policy over a number of new dimensions that previously have not been explored.
We ﬁnd the following. First, the use of revenues that can be raised through carbon pricing
affects both the efﬁciency and equity of the policy. Analyses that focus solely on the impacts of
carbon pricing without considering the use of revenues can lead to seriously misleading results.
Second, the use of a model with a large number of households allows us to consider distributional
impacts over different sub-populations. It also drives home the point that variation in impacts
from a carbon pricing policy within sub-groups may swamp the variation across groups. Third,
we provide two measures that proxy for lifetime income and ﬁnd little evidence that the use of
annual income biases carbon pricing towards greater regressivity. Finally we ﬁnd interesting
variation across racial and ethnic groups that have not been addressed in the literature to date.
We turn next to some background on the measurement of the burden of carbon pricing. Section
three describes the model and the following section presents results. We conclude in section 5.
2. BACKGROUND
Carbon pricing through a cap-and-trade system has very similar impacts to broad based energy
taxes - not surprising since over eighty percent of greenhouse gas emissions are associated with
the combustion of fossil fuels (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2009). The literature on
distributional implications across income groups of energy taxes is a long and extensive one and
some general conclusions have been reached that help inform the distributional analysis of carbon
pricing. First, analyses that rank households by their annual income ﬁnd that excise taxes in
general tend to be regressive (e.g. Pechman, 1985, looking at excise taxes in general and Metcalf,
1999, looking speciﬁcally at a cluster of environmental taxes).
2The difﬁculty with this ranking procedure is that many households in the lowest income
groups are not poor in any traditional sense that should raise welfare concerns. This group
includes households that are facing transitory negative income shocks or who are making human
capital investments that will lead to higher incomes later in life (e.g. graduate students). It also
includes many retired households which may have little current income but are able to draw on
extensive savings.
That current income may not be a good measure of household well being has long been known
and has led to a number of efforts to measure lifetime income. This leads to the second major
ﬁnding in the literature. Consumption taxes - including taxes on energy - look considerably less
regressive when lifetime income measures are used than when annual income measures are used.
Studies include Davies et al. (1984), Poterba (1989, 1991), Bull et al. (1994), Lyon and Schwab
(1995) and many others. Most of these studies look at a snapshot of taxes in one year relative to
some proxy for lifetime income - often current consumption based on the permanent income
hypothesis of Friedman (1957).
The lifetime income approach is an important caveat to distributional ﬁndings from annual
incidence analyses but it relies on strong assumptions about household consumption decisions. In
particular it assumes that households base current consumption decisions knowing their full
stream of earnings over their lifetime. While it is reasonable to assume that households have some
sense of future income, it may be implausible to assume they have complete knowledge or that
they necessarily base spending decisions on income that may be received far in the future. We
report results in this paper using both an annual income measure and a lifetime income measure.
Turning to climate policy in particular a number of papers have attempted to measure the
distributional impacts of carbon pricing across household income groups. Dinan and Rogers
(2002) build on Metcalf (1999) to consider how the distribution of allowances from a cap and
trade program affects the distributional outcome. Both these papers emphasize that focusing on
the distributional burden of carbon pricing (either a tax or auctioned permits) without regard to
the use of the revenue raised (or potentially raised) from carbon pricing provides an incomplete
distributional analysis. How the proceeds from carbon pricing are distributed have important
impacts on the ultimate distributional outcome.
The point that use of carbon revenues matters for distribution is the basis for the distributional
and revenue neutral proposal in Metcalf (2007) for a carbon tax swap. It is also the focus of the
analysis in Burtraw et al. (2009b). This latter paper considers ﬁve different uses of revenue from a
cap and trade auction focusing on income distribution as well as regional distribution. A similar
focus on income and regional distribution is in Hassett et al. (2009). This last paper does not
consider the use of revenue but does compare both annual and lifetime income measures as well
as a regional analysis using annual income. Grainger and Kolstad (2009) do a similar analysis as
that of Hassett et al. (2009) and note that the use of household equivalence scales can exacerbate
the regressivity of carbon pricing. Finally Burtraw et al. (2009a) consider the distributional
impacts in an expenditure side analysis where they focus on the allocation of permits to local
distribution companies (LDCs). Rausch et al. (2010b) also investigate the welfare costs of
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prices by consumers have large efﬁciency costs.
With the exception of the last paper, all of the papers above assume that the burden of carbon
pricing is shifted forward to consumers in the form of higher energy prices and higher prices of
energy-intensive consumption goods and services. That carbon pricing is passed forward to
consumers follows from the analysis of a number of computable general equilibrium (CGE)
models. Bovenberg and Goulder (2001), for example, ﬁnd that coal prices rise by over 90 percent
of a $25 per ton carbon tax in the short and long run (Table 2.4). This incidence result underlies
their ﬁnding that only a small percentage of permits need be freely allocated to energy intensive
industries to compensate shareholders for any windfall losses from a cap and trade program. See
also Bovenberg et al. (2005) for more on this issue.
Metcalf et al. (2008) consider the degree of forward shifting, as a result of higher consumer
prices and backward shifting, as a result of lower factor returns, over different time periods for a
carbon tax policy begun in 2012 and slowly ramped up through 2050. The tax on carbon
emissions from coal are largely passed forward to consumers in all years of the policy in roughly
the same magnitude found by Bovenberg and Goulder (2001). Roughly ten percent of the burden
of carbon pricing on crude oil is shifted back to oil producers initially with the share rising to
roughly one-fourth by 2050 as consumers are able to ﬁnd substitutes for oil in the longer run.
Interestingly the consumer burden of the carbon tax on natural gas exceeds the tax. This reﬂects
the sharp rise in demand for natural gas as an initial response to carbon pricing is to substitute gas
for coal in electricity generation. By 2050 the producer price is falling for reasonably stringent
carbon policies.1
Fullerton and Heutel (2007) construct an analytic general equilibrium model to identify the
various key parameters and relationships that determine the ultimate burden of a tax on a
pollutant. While the model is not sufﬁciently detailed to provide a realistic assessment of climate
change impacts on the U.S. economy it illustrates critical parameters and relationships that drive
burden results. The general equilibrium models discussed above all assume a representative agent
in the U.S. thereby limiting their usefulness to considering distributional questions. Metcalf et al.
(2008) apply results from a representative agent model to data on U.S. households that allows
them to draw conclusions about distributional impacts of policies but the household heterogeneity
is not built into the model.
Rausch et al. (2010b) does an explicit CGE analysis of carbon pricing in a single-period CGE
model. That analysis considers a variety of possible allocations of the revenue and/or allowances
from cap-and-trade system and ﬁnds that the use of revenues affects the overall progressivity of
the policy substantially. It also ﬁnds that a signiﬁcant portion of the carbon price is passed back to
factors of production - most notably owners of natural resources and capital. This contributes to a
1 Any shift from coal or oil to natural gas in the near term would blunt the sources-side impacts to the extent that
capital returns in the gas industry rise. This gives rise to capital inﬂows to equilibrate capital returns across sectors.
4greater progressivity of carbon pricing than found in literature that assumes full forward shifting.
This paper builds on that earlier analysis but with considerably more households.
3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This section provides an overview of the simulation model, and describes the CEX data set and
the computational technique employed to integrate endogenously all households as individual
agents into the general equilibrium framework.
3.1 Model Overview
We employ a static large-open economy version of the MIT U.S. Regional Energy Policy
(USREP) model (Rausch et al., 2010a, 2010b), a multi-region and multi-sector general
equilibrium model for the U.S. economy. USREP is designed to assess the impacts of energy and
climate policies on regions, sectors and industries, and different household income classes. In this
paper we extend the earlier model that featured a representative agent for each income class to a
model with 15,588 households integrated into a single model. As a detailed algebraic description
of the model is provided in Rausch et al. (2010b), we here brieﬂy provide an overview of the
model and focus on the key features that are necessary to generalize the model to 15,588
households.
The structure of the model is summarized in Table 1. Much of the sectoral detail in the
USREP model is focused on providing an accurate representation of energy production and use as
it may change under policies that would limit greenhouse gas emissions. Here we group
economic sectors as either energy demand sectors or energy supply and conversion sectors.
Energy demand sectors include ﬁve industrial and three ﬁnal demand sectors. Each industrial
sector interacts with the rest of the economy through an input-output structure. The model
describes production and consumption activities as nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution
(CES) production functions. A schematic overview of the nesting structure for each sector is
provided in the Appendix A in Rausch et al. (2010b), and is largely similar to the approach
implemented in the EPPA model (Paltsev et al., 2005). The energy sector, which emits several of
the non-CO2 gases as well as CO2, is modeled in more detail. In this analysis we apply a
relatively low carbon price, $20 per ton CO2-equivalent with the intent of showing results
relevant to the ﬁrst few years of a climate policy. The static version of the model incorporates
electricity generation from fossil fuel, nuclear and hydro power and existing fuels, but not the
array of advanced energy supply technologies as in the dynamic version of the model (Rausch
et al., 2010a). Electricity outputs generated from different technologies are assumed to be perfect
substitutes. We constrain the expansion of nuclear and hydro power to no more than a 20 percent
relative to the benchmark level, or given this structure, production from these sources can expand
without bound. Other advanced technologies would only be relevant at higher CO2 prices and
further into the future, and so we believe the static model, as formulated, is appropriate to study
the effects of a relatively modest GHG pricing policy implemented in the near term.
Hence, results of the USREP show the impact we would expect of implementing a CO2 price
5Table 1. USREP Model Details.
Sectors Regionsa Production Factors
Industrial sectors West (WEST) Capital
Agriculture (AGR) Mountain (MOUNT) Labor
Services (SRV) North Central (NCENT) Resource factors
Energy-intensive products (EIS) South Central (SCENT) Coal
Other industries products (OTH) South East (SEAST) Natural gas
Transportation (TRN) North East (NEAST) Crude oil












Note: Model regions are aggregations of the following U.S. states: WEST = Alaska, California, Oregon, Washington,
Hawaii; MOUNT=Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, NewMexico; NCENT=Missouri,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa; SCENT = Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas;
SEAST = Virginia, Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida;
NEAST = Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, West Virginia, Delaware,
Maryland, Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, District of Columbia, New York.
of $20 (and maintaining it) over a ﬁve to ten year interval.2 Like the EPPA model, the USREP
model does not measure damages from climate change (or climate beneﬁts from reduced
emissions). This model is best suited for carrying out cost effectiveness analyses of proposed
emission reductions.
The model distinguishes six regions which are aggregations of U.S. states as deﬁned in Table 1
and visualized in Figure 1. We assume that all goods are tradable. Depending on the type of
commodity, we distinguish three different representations of intra-national regional trade. First,
bilateral ﬂows for all non-energy goods are represented as Armington (1969) goods where like
goods from other regions are imperfectly substitutable for domestically produced goods. Second,
domestically traded energy goods, except for electricity, are assumed to be homogeneous
2 Trying to pin down the time dimensions of a general equilibrium model is always risky. Our point here is not so
much that this is the relevant time horizon but rather that we are focusing on the response to a modest carbon price
that precludes the introduction of highly innovative - and necessarily - speculative technologies that are not yet in
existence.
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Figure 1. Regional Aggregation.
products, i.e. there is a national pool that demands domestic exports and supplies domestic
imports. This assumption reﬂects the high degree of integration of intra-U.S. markets for natural
gas, crude and reﬁned oil, and coal. Third, we differentiate three regional electricity pools that are
designed to provide an approximation of the existing structure of independent system operators
(ISO) and the three major NERC interconnections in the U.S. More speciﬁcally, we distinguish
the Western, Texas ERCOT and the Eastern NERC interconnections as separate regional pools.
We assume that within each regional pool traded electricity is a homogenous good and that there
is no electricity trade between regional pools.3
Analogously to the export side, we adopt the Armington (1969) assumption of product
heterogeneity for imports. A CES function characterizes the trade-off between imported (from
national and international sources) and locally produced varieties of the same goods. Foreign
closure of the model is determined through a national balance-of-payments (BOP) constraint.
Hence, the total value of U.S. exports equals the total value of U.S. imports accounting for an
initial BOP deﬁcit given by the base year statistics. The BOP constraint thereby determines the
real exchange rate which indicates the (endogenous) value of the domestic currency vis--vis the
foreign currency. The U.S. economy as a whole is modeled as a large open economy, by
specifying elasticities for world export demand and world import supply functions. Thus, while
we do not explicitly model other regions, the simulations include terms of trade and
competitiveness effects of policies that approximate results we would get with a full global model.
We assume that labor is fully mobile across industries in a given region but is immobile across
3 The regional electricity pools are thus deﬁned as follows. The Western NERC interconnection comprises WEST and
MOUNT. The Eastern NERC interconnection comprises NEAST, SEAST, and NCENT. Texas ERCOT comprises
the SCENT region.
7U.S. regions. Capital is mobile across regions and industries. We assume an integrated U.S.
market for fossil fuel resources and assume that the regional ownership of resources is distributed
in proportion to capital income.4
Conventional tax rates are differentiated by region and sector and include both federal and
state taxes comprising ad-valorem output taxes, corporate capital income taxes, and personal
income taxes. Revenue from these taxes is assumed to be spent in each region, proportional to its
current levels. This takes account of varying state tax levels, and the current distribution of the
spending of Federal tax revenue among the states. Different assumptions are reasonable but the
intent here is to keep a focus on the implications of CO2 pricing and carbon revenue distribution,
and not muddy that by assuming changes in distribution of other Federal or State tax revenues.
3.2 Data
Our dataset has three main components: (i) a sample of U.S. households from the 2006
Consumer and Expenditure Survey (CEX), (ii) Social Accounting Matrix data for each U.S. state
from the 2006 IMPLAN dataset, and (iii) physical energy and price data from the 2006 State
Energy Data System (SEDS) as published by the Energy Information Administration (EIA). By
merging these three types of information, we obtain an unusually rich dataset that integrates
economic and energy data, captures the heterogeneity of households with respect to spending
patterns and income sources, and incorporates information on a number of demographic variables
for each household.
3.2.1 The CEX Sample
We use the 2006 Consumer Expenditure Survey, a widely used source of data on consumption
expenditures, income, and demographic household characteristics (see, e.g., Attanasio, 1998,
Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger, 2006, and Metcalf et al., 2010) that is collected for the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The CEX is a rotating panel, and it is designed to constitute a
representative sample of the U.S. population. Each household is interviewed every three months
over ﬁve calendar quarters, and every quarter 20 percent of the sample is replaced by new
households. For the purpose of this paper, there are a number of issues with the way the CEX data
are collected that make it difﬁcult to use them directly.
First, we want to include all households that report expenditures and income for 2006 even if
they have only been interviewed for a subset of quarters in this year. We follow the procedure
outline in Bureau of Labor Statistics (2006, pp. 271) to obtain annual estimates for each
household.
Second, the CEX consists of two surveys, the Interview Survey and the Diary Survey. The
Interview Survey is designed to capture large purchases, such as spending on rent property and
vehicles and those that occur on a regular basis such as rent or utilities. The Diary Survey is
4 Given the lack of data describing the regional ownership of fossil fuel resources in the U.S., we use capital income
as a proxy.
8meant to capture small frequently purchased items. The Interview Survey collects data on about
95 percent of total household expenditures. We combine data from both surveys to provide a
complete account of expenditures by ﬁrst computing population-weighted averages for each CEX
expenditure category for different sub-groups of households in the Diary Survey. We deﬁne the
sub-groups by income class, region, age, and urban/rural. Based on these sub-groups, we combine
sub-group average expenditures from the Diary Survey with expenditures for each household in
the Interview Survey. For some expenditure categories data is collected in both surveys; we follow
the approach outlined in Bureau of Labor Statistics (2006) to determine which expenditure data is
taken from which survey. For our economic model we only use households from the Interview
Survey with combined expenditures from both surveys as individual households from the Diary
Survey lack data for most of the spending categories.
Third, to obtain expenditure data that are consistent with the deﬁnition of consumption goods
in our macroeconomic data, we have to map CEX expenditure categories to North American
Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) accounts. This is accomplished by ﬁrst aggregating CEX
data into roughly 70 Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) categories, and then using a
bridge matrix from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2007) to map expenditures from PCE to
NAICS categories.
Fourth, for about 14% of households in the CEX data state identiﬁers have been suppressed for
privacy reasons. This occurs mostly in rural states. There is information in the CEX data on
which state codes have been suppressed. To retain the representativeness of the sample we keep
those households in the data set by randomly assigning them to one of the states with suppressed
state identiﬁers. Fifth, households with income above a certain level are “top-coded”, i.e. their
income is replaced with the national average. There are different thresholds for different types of
income (e.g., $150k for wage and salary income). At the household level, we see a substantial
amount of top-coding for the top 4% of the income distribution when pre-tax income reaches
$250k. Note that top-coding can make income go both up and down because the replacement
value may be higher than the real value. While we keep those households in the sample, this
means that we cannot break out the top 4% income class.
Sixth, a well-known issue with household survey data in general and with the CEX data in
particular is that capital income seems to be too low when compared to capital income based on
National Account data (e.g., Deaton, 2003, and Rutherford and Tarr, 2008). A second problem
with using CEX reported capital income is that it may misrepresent capital holdings across
income groups (Metcalf et al., 2010). There are two possible reasons. First, the CEX focuses
primarily on spending and the income data quality may not be as high quality as the spending
data. Second, if holdings of growth stocks are disproportionately held by higher income groups
then the CEX capital income measure will be biased towards more capital holdings in lower
income groups. Following Metcalf et al. (2010) we correct for this bias by incorporating data on
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More speciﬁcally, we replace CEX reported capital income for each household by imputed capital
income based on capital income shares by income decile from SCF and total household income
from CEX. To accommodate changes in capital income while keeping CEX reported total income
ﬁxed at the household level, we adjust labor income.
Seventh, as imputed personal income tax rates using CEX reported income tax payments are
too low, we incorporate personal income tax rates based on data from the NBER TAXSIM tax
simulator. A ﬁnal issue with the use of the CEX data is that for the purpose of including
households in the general equilibrium model, we need to ensure that income balance is satisﬁed in
the benchmark equilibrium. This condition requires that pre-tax household income is equal to the
sum of consumption expenditures, tax payments, and savings. As savings are not reported directly
in the CEX data, we impute savings as pre-tax household income minus the sum of consumption
expenditures and tax payments, and use this approach to close the income balance. For about 35%
of households in the sample, consumption expenditures exceed total household income, i.e. there
is not sufﬁcient current income to ﬁnance observed consumption. As there does not seem to be a
perceivable pattern in the CEX data that would help to identify the type of income that falls short
of observed expenditures, we assume for these households that consumption in excess of
observable household income is ﬁnanced by a stream of capital income.6
3.2.2 National Account and Energy Data
Our model is based on state-level data from IMPLAN (Minnesota IMPLAN Group, 2008) in
the form of Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) data covering economic transactions among
businesses, households, and government agents for the year 2006. Aggregation and reconciliation
of IMPLAN state-level economic accounts to generate a benchmark data set which can be used
for model calibration is accomplished using ancillary tools documented in Rausch and Rutherford
(2009). In addition, our data set integrates energy data from the Energy Information
Administration’s (EIA) State Energy Data System (Energy Information Administration, 2009)
comprising price and quantity data on energy production, consumption and trade. For each state,
we have replaced all energy data in the economic IMPLAN data set with assembled
price-quantity EIA data and used optimization techniques (ordinary least squares) to reconcile
economic and energy data Rausch and Rutherford (2009). The integrated data set is
5 One advantage of using the SCF is that it disproportionately samples wealthy families. Each survey consists of a
core representative sample combined with a high income supplement, which is drawn from the Internal Revenue
Service’s Statistics of Income data ﬁle. Further, the survey questionnaire consists of detailed questions on different
components of family wealth holdings. For these reasons, the SCF is widely acknowledged to be the best at
capturing both the wealth at the top of the distribution and the complete wealth portfolio of households in the
middle. Since the wealth distribution is highly skewed towards the top, most other surveys (like the CEX) that
have poor data on high income families tend to underreport measures of income and wealth.
6 Future work has to explore the implications of different assumptions for reconciling the income and expenditure
accounts of individual households.
10micro-consistent and is benchmarked to EIA energy statistics. Additional data for the greenhouse
gas (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6) emissions is based on U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (2009) inventory data, including endogenous costing of the abatement of non-CO2
greenhouse gases (Hyman et al., 2002). Following the approach outlined in Paltsev et al. (2005)
the model incorporates supplemental physical accounts to link economic data in value terms with
physical quantities on energy production, consumption and trade.
3.3 Computational Approach and Reconciliation of National Account and Household Sur-
vey Data
The main challenge for computing equilibria in a numerical model with 15,588 households is
dimensionality. Simultaneous solution methods that operate directly on the system of equations
that deﬁne the general equilibrium (GE) can become infeasible if the number of variables and
equations is too large. We use a decomposition algorithm by Rutherford and Tarr (2008) and
Rausch and Rutherford (2010) to integrate all households endogenously within our general
equilibrium model.
The key idea of the algorithm is to solve a market economy with many households through the
computation of equilibria for a sequence of representative agent (RA) economies. The algorithm
decomposes the numerical problem into two sub-problems and employs an iterative procedure
between them to ﬁnd the equilibrium of the underlying model. The ﬁrst sub-problem computes
candidate equilibrium prices from a version of the GE model where the household demand side in
each region is replaced by a single RA. The second sub-problem solves a partial equilibrium (PE)
relaxation of the underlying model by evaluating demand functions for each of the 15,588
households given candidate GE prices from the RA problem. The iterative procedure between
both sub-problems involves the re-calibration of preferences of the RA in each region based on
PE quantity choices by ”real” households. This ensures that the GE prices derived from the RA
model, which include a mutually consistent GE response of ﬁrms and the demand by the RA, are
consistent with PE demand by individual households. The algorithm ﬁnds the equilibrium of the
underlying economy if the sequence of GE prices and PE quantities converge to the true
equilibrium prices and quantities.7 Appendix A describes our speciﬁcation of household utility
and the implementation of the decomposition algorithm in the context of the USREP model.
In order to implement our integrated model and to apply the decomposition algorithm we have
to produce a balanced Social Accounting Matrix that reconciles differences between aggregated
consumption, factor and resource incomes, and transfers from National Account IMPLAN data
and household survey CEX data. This step is necessary to ensure that in the absence of a policy
7 Rutherford and Tarr (2008) use this technique to solve a large-scale, static general equilibrium model with 25 sec-
tors and 53,000 households to assess the poverty effects of Russia’s WTO accession. Rausch (2009) and Rausch
and Rutherford (2010) apply a variant of the method to compute equilibria in multi-sector multi-region over-
lapping generations models with many heterogeneous households to study the macroeconomic implications of
demographic change.
11Table 2. Carbon Revenue Distribution Scenarios.
Scenario Description
inctax Marginal income tax rates for all households are reduced by the same percentage amount.
percapita Equal per capita lump sum transfers to households.
capital Lump sum transfers to households proportional to capital income.
Note: In all scenarios, government spending is held ﬁxed at its benchmark level. Revenue neutrality is achieved
by endogenously calculating the reduction in income tax rates or by withholding a fraction of the carbon revenue,
respectively.
shock iterating between the RA GE and the PE household modules returns the no-policy
benchmark equilibrium. Violation of this initial condition would mean that simulated policy
impacts are confounded with equilibrium adjustments due to initial inconsistencies between the
benchmark of the two sub-models.
We produce a balanced SAM by introducing an artiﬁcial household in each region where
benchmark consumption by commodity and income by source are calculated as residuals between
National Accounts and the (aggregated) CEX data. The virtue of this approach is to preserve both
the macroeconomic description of the economy and the individual household data. One caveat of
this approach is that estimates for economy-wide welfare costs have to take into account welfare
changes by the artiﬁcial households, i.e. they have to be based on the entire economy.8
3.4 Calibration
As is customary in applied general equilibrium analysis, we use prices and quantities of the
integrated economic-energy data set for the benchmark year 2006 to calibrate the distribution
parameters of the CES functions that describe production and consumption technologies.
Exogenous elasticities determine the free parameters of the functional forms, and Tables A1-A2
in Rausch et al. (2010b) provide a full list of the numerical values used to parameterize the model.
4. SCENARIOS AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Model Scenarios
We now consider a climate policy with an equilibrium carbon price of $20 per ton of carbon
dioxide-equivalent (CO2e). This could be implemented either through a cap and trade system or a
carbon tax. In our model, the two approaches are indistinguishable. A cap and trade system with
fully auctioned permits is equivalent in impact to a carbon tax where the tax rate equals the
market clearing auction price. As noted above, distributional impacts of carbon pricing depend in
part on the use of proceeds raised by the policy. We consider three revenue distribution schemes
as described in Table 2.
8 We note that other approaches to data reconciliation are conceivable that do not rely on the introduction of an
artiﬁcial household. Such approaches would either adjust the national account data or the household survey data
(or a combination of both) depending on how much weight is placed on each data set. Future work has to explore
the sensitivity of model results with respect to different approaches to reconcile both data sources.
12In the ﬁrst scenario (inctax), revenue from auctioning of permits is used to lower marginal tax
rates on income. Marginal rates are reduced endogenously by 5.64 percent. This should provide
efﬁciency beneﬁts as discussed in the large literature on the Double Dividend (see Goulder, 1995,
for a description of this literature). The second scenario (percapita) distributes the revenue to
households on an equal per capita basis. Thus a household of four would receive a transfer twice
as large as a household of size two. It is expected that this allowance allocation will have a more
progressive distributional outcome but at the cost of efﬁciency. The third scenario (capital)
distributes revenue to households in proportion to their capital income. If permits are freely
allocated to carbon intensive industries, as they have been in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme,
they provide a lump sum windfall to owners of this industry. We model this by assuming that the
distribution of ownership in carbon intensive industries matches the distribution of capital
ownership in general.9
For all scenarios we impose revenue neutrality by holding government spending–including
transfer payments–ﬁxed at its benchmark level.10 For scenarios where we use lump-sum recycling
instruments, we assume that an endogenously determined fraction of the carbon revenue is
withheld to satisfy the neutrality constraint. In the inctax scenario we solve endogenously for a
uniform percentage reduction in marginal income tax rates.11
4.2 Results
We begin by reporting average welfare impacts of a cap and trade system with a $20 per ton
CO2e permit price. Welfare impacts are measured as the equivalent variation (EV) of the policy
reported as a percentage of household income. Average costs are lowest if the carbon revenue is
used to lower personal income tax rates (0.18 percent of household income). Consistent with the
Double Dividend literature, welfare costs rise if the revenue is returned lump sum. The costs in
this case are over twice as great (0.38 percent for the capital and 0.46 percent for the percapita
scenario). Welfare costs are higher if the revenue is returned on a per capita basis than
proportional to capital income. The result that changes in the lump sum distribution scheme can
have efﬁciency consequences has also been found by Rausch et al. (2010a). Increasing the share
of allowance value to high income households relative to low income households lowers the cost
of the policy as high income households spend a smaller fraction of any distribution on carbon
intensive products.
Figure 2 shows the distributional impact by annual income groups for the various scenarios.
9 We have not made an adjustment for capital income received by foreigners. This affects the analysis to some extent
by allocating to US capital owners a portion of the burden that falls outside the United States. This should not
appreciably affect the results.
10 In a static model, this is equivalent to indexing transfer payments since the price level is the numeraire price.
11 Assuming separability between utility derived from private and government spending, the revenue neutrality con-
straint allows us to compare welfare impacts across different scenarios by holding the utility of government spend-
ing constant.
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Figure 2. Average Welfare Impacts by Income Group.
We report averages for income deciles except for the top and bottom deciles, where we show
results for ﬁner disaggregations. At the bottom of the distribution, we are concerned the very high
consumption to income ratios reported in the Consumer Expenditure Survey mask signiﬁcant
income underreporting along with borrowing among certain household groups (most notably
young and old households). Focusing ﬁrst in the inctax scenario and setting aside the bottom two
percent of the income distribution, the carbon price with income tax reductions is regressive with
burdens ranging from -0.3 percent in the lowest decile to -0.1 percent in the top decile. This is
consistent with other analyses and reﬂects the tension between equity and efﬁciency in policy
setting.
The two forms of lump-sum redistribution both show higher average costs but very different
relative costs across the income distribution. Per capita household rebates are progressive—even
if one ignores the bottom two percent of the household income distribution. In contrast, the
scenario corresponding to free allocation of permits to carbon intensive industries is proportional
over the bottom 90 percent of the income distribution but regressive in the top decile.
As noted above, a number of researchers have argued that energy taxes look more regressive
than is in fact the case because of biases that are impacted by the use of annual income to rank
households. There are two issues here. First, households are likely to smooth consumption over
transitory income shocks. Smoothing will tend to bias measures of consumption taxes toward
greater measured regressivity. Second, households making consumption decisions on the basis of
lifetime income may also have very high consumption to income ratios in periods when income is
low (e.g. at the beginning or end of life).
To address these factors, we show distributional results using two proxies for lifetime income.
Our ﬁrst measure restricts attention to households where the head of household is between the
14 
Figure 3. Mean Welfare Impacts by Income Group: Age 40-60.
ages of 40 and 60. This excludes young households who are making consumption decisions in
anticipation of higher future income and elderly households who may be drawing down savings in
retirement. Results are shown in Figure 3. Excluding the bottom two percent of the income
distribution, the inctax and capital scenarios continue to look modestly regressive while the
percapita scenario is quite progressive.
As a second proxy for lifetime income we classify households by educational outcome of the
head of household (Figure 4). Under the assumption that education is positively correlated with
lifetime income, we continue to ﬁnd the same distributional patterns as we found using annual
income to rank households. Based on the results from Figures 3 and 4, it does not appear that
signiﬁcant bias arises from using annual income measures in this analysis.
We also report results where we decompose impacts by racial and ethnic groups (Table 3).
The USREP model calibrates the model to reﬂect factor income and expenditure shares by these
groups (as well as by income, education, and region). Households with a Black head bear a higher
burden than do households with a White or Other head (the last group includes Native American,
Asian, Paciﬁc Islander, and Multi-race). The average burden under the inctax scenario is 191
percent higher for Blacks than Whites. This reﬂects differences in income and spending patterns
across the two groups, not anything inherent to racial characteristics.
Interestingly, the ratio of the Black to White burden is higher for this scenario than for the
capital scenario. The percapita distribution reduces the difference to 124 percent. The higher
burden on Blacks can mainly be explained by the observed differences in spending patterns
according to the CEX data: Blacks exhibit a higher expenditure share of electricity (4.8%) and
natural gas (2.0%) compared to Whites (2.9% and 1.1%), respectively.
Hispanics also appear to incur a higher burden of carbon pricing than do other groups for the
15 
Figure 4. Mean Welfare Impacts by Education.




White -0.17 -0.37 -0.45
Black -0.32 -0.50 -0.56
Other -0.06 -0.25 -0.37
Ethnic Group
Other -0.17 -0.46 -0.37
Hispanic -0.21 -0.43 -0.42
All -0.19 -0.41 -0.41
capital and inctax scenarios. The discrepancy is not as large as between Blacks and Whites. In
fact their average burden is lower under the percapita scenario. We track this difference to the
sources side. On average, Hispanics derive a signiﬁcantly smaller fraction of their annual income
from government transfers (11.3% versus 16.8% for other ethnic groups) which means that are
less insulated against adverse factor price changes.
In previous papers (see Rausch et al., 2010a, 2010b) we have shown that carbon pricing policy
has differential impacts across regions with the North and South Central parts of the country
disproportionately affected. Conversely the North East and West are least impacted. Our analysis
here upholds those results (Figure 5). These results reﬂect the reliance of the middle parts of the
country on coal for electricity generation. The North East and West, in contrast, are more reliant
on hydro and nuclear power for electricity generation. The mean welfare change in the West is
positive under the inctax scenario, as this region exhibits by far the lowest emissions and energy
intensity of Gross State Product of all regions translating into relatively modest price increases for
electricity and carbon-intensive goods. At the same time household beneﬁts from the uniform
reduction in personal income tax rates across regions that is based on the sum of regional carbon









Figure 5. Mean Welfare Impacts by Region.
revenues.
4.3 Heterogeneity in Impacts
Tracking a large number of households allows us to explore burden impacts in greater detail.
Here we consider the variation in impacts within groups. Consider Figure 6. This shows box
plots for burden impacts within annual income deciles for the three scenarios
Consider the Box Plot for the inctax scenario. The inner quartile range (IQR) for burden
impacts in the lowest income decile runs from -0.4 to 0.1 percent of income. Over one-quarter of
households in this income group beneﬁt from this policy. This is true in all income groups. While
the median (and mean) welfare impacts are negative for each group, between one-quarter and
one-half of households in each group beneﬁt from this policy. The ”whiskers” show outlier values
within 1.5 times the IQR of the nearest quartile. For the inctax scenario, the largest negative
outlier burdens were roughly one percent of income. Figure 6 makes the point that focusing on
averages across income groups obscures important variation within income groups that may
swamp the variation in average effects across income groups.
Figure 7 presents additional information on the heterogeneity of impacts by income groups. In
particular, it shows the share of households that incur a welfare loss in excess of one percent of
annual income. Focusing on the inctax scenario, 11.5 percent of households in the lowest decile
incur such a large loss. Interestingly, the share falls as income rises up to the ﬁfth decile where 1.4
percent of households incur a large loss. It stabilizes at this level across the top part of the income
distribution.
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Figure 6. Box Plots by Income Decile.
income) under the capital scenario. As many as 5 percent of households experience these losses
through the seventh decile. The percapita scenario has a pattern of large losses similar to the
inctax scenario though with signiﬁcantly larger impacts up to the ﬁfth decile and with rising
losses for the top of the distribution.
We repeat this analysis looking at households across regions (Figure 8). As above, a greater
percentage of households are likely to suffer large losses in the capital and percapita scenarios
than inctax scenario. The South Central region has the largest share under any of the scenarios.
The percentage of households in this region who suffer large losses ranges between 17 and 33
percent. Just as the Northeast and West are least adversely impacted by carbon pricing under the
various rebate scenarios, these regions are least likely to have households with large losses. The
biggest difference across regions is their fuel source for electricity. Figure 9 shows that
considerably more electricity is generated by coal in Mountain states and the North Central parts
of the country than elsewhere.
A similar pattern emerges for racial and ethnic groups. Households with Black heads are more
likely to suffer a large loss with the probability being highest under the capital scenario (Figure
10). A similar pattern emerges for Hispanic groups.
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Figure 7. Percent of Households with Welfare Loss in Excess of 1 Percent of Income: by Income.
0 10 20 30 40









Figure 8. Percent of Households with Welfare Loss in Excess of 1 Percent of Income: by Region.
4.4 Drivers of Impacts
Finally, we explore the drivers of the various impacts across the different groups. Impacts can
occur on both the sources and uses side. We explore each in turn.
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Figure 9. Electricity Generation by Fossil Fuel Across Regions.
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Figure 10. Percent of Households with Welfare Loss in Excess of 1 Percent of Income: by Race.
4.4.1 Sources of Income
Carbon policy will affect factor prices in potentially differential ways. Recall that labor is
mobile within but not across regions in our model. Therefore carbon policy differentially affects
wage rates. Figure 11 reports on the primary axis wage changes across regions under the different
scenarios and on the secondary axis regional indices for energy and greenhouse gas emissions
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Figure 11. Changes in Wages and Energy and Emissions Intensity.
intensity. The indices measure benchmark energy use (in Exajoules) and emissions (million
metric tons) per dollar of Gross State Product, respectively, and are normalized to one for the U.S.
A value larger than one means that regional intensity is above the respective U.S. average. Wage
rates fall the most in the Mountain states as well as the North and South Central states as the
impact on industrial activity and hence labor demand in these regions is relatively large due to
high energy and emissions intensities. Conversely, the NEAST and WEST regions that have
already de-carbonized to some extent experience only relatively small reductions in wage rates.
Capital, on the other hand, is traded in national markets. The percentage change in after-tax of
return capital rental rates for the inctax, capital, and percapita scenarios are -0.9, -1.1, and -1.1,
respectively. The rates fall the least in the inctax scenario reﬂecting the reduction in marginal tax
rates on income in this scenario. We compare this with an U.S. average of regional wage changes.
The percentage after-tax return of wage rates for the for the inctax, capital, and percapita
scenarios are -0.8, -0.7, and -0.7, respectively.
Wages on average fall less than capital rental rates. Figure 12 shows household sources of
income by type. The share of income from capital is slightly declining up to the fourth decile and
is then roughly constant through the 80th percentile at which point it begins to rise. The share of
income from labor rises with income while the importance of government transfers diminishes.
This pattern suggests two things. First our treatment of transfer income adds progressivity to
carbon pricing. By holding the price of transfer income constant (put differently, holding transfer
income constant as part of our treatment of government in the model), lower income groups that
depend more heavily on transfer income beneﬁt as factor prices fall. While it is certainly possible
that government will adjust transfers as part of a larger adjustment to carbon pricing, it should be
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Figure 12. Income Sources.
Table 4. Average Welfare Impact by Combined Expenditure Share for Electricity and Natural Gas (Percent
of Full Income).
Scenario
Share inctax capital percapita
<0.1 -0.13 -0.34 -0.43
0.1-0.2 -0.84 -1.00 -0.85
0.2-0.3 -1.26 -1.38 -1.20
0.3-0.4 -1.89 -1.89 -1.61
0.4-0.5 -2.57 -2.64 -2.31
0.5-0.6 -3.14 -3.12 -3.11
clear that such an adjustment mixes climate policy with a ﬁscal policy decision.
Second, higher income households are affected on the sources side due to the larger fall in
wage rates than capital rental rates. Capital income constitutes a higher proportion of income for
households in the top two deciles. The decline in the capital to labor factor return adversely
affects these high income households as a result.
4.4.2 Uses of Income
Uses side impacts are driven in large part by expenditures on electricity and natural gas. Table
4 shows that the average welfare change rises sharply for all scenarios with the share of spending
on these two commodities.
Turning to income groups, we see that electricity and natural gas are disproportionately
important in low-income budgets (Table 5). Similarly Black households show a higher fraction of
spending on these two commodities. Residents in the South Central and South East regions
consume electricity at higher shares of spending than residents of other regions. As noted above,
electricity in the South Central region is more carbon intensive exacerbating the impact of carbon
pricing on residents of this region.
22Table 5. Benchmark Expenditure Shares for Electricity and Gas by Income, Race, Ethnic Group, and




























4.4.3 Decomposing Uses and Sources Side Effects
To better understand the relative importance of sources and uses side impacts, we run one
additional simulation where we impose the carbon pricing policy and use the revenue in ways that
do not enter the consumers’ utility functions. This allows us to isolate the distributional impacts
of carbon pricing by itself without respect to the use of revenues. We then consider two
counterfactuals. First, we recalibrate the model so that all households have identical expenditures
shares for each commodity regardless of income. Any burden differences across income groups
will therefore be driven entirely by sources side effects. The second counterfactual is constructed
by re-calibrating the model so that all households have identical factor income shares regardless
of income. Now all burden differences across income are driven by uses side effects.
Figure 13 shows the carbon pricing burdens as a percentage of full income for carbon pricing
itself and the two counterfactuals. The ﬁrst thing to note is that carbon pricing by itself is roughly
proportional. The burden ranges from 0.61 percent of full income for the lowest income decile to
0.67 percent of income for the fourth, sixth, and seventh deciles. The progressivity or regressivity
of the various scenarios we analyzed above are entirely driven by the mechanism for distributing
proceeds from carbon pricing.
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Figure 13. Relative Sources vs. Uses Side Impacts across Income Distribution.
The second ﬁnding from the counterfactual analyses is that the burden of carbon pricing (by
deciles) arising from uses side effects is regressive. The average burden by deciles ranges from
0.91 percent of income for the lowest income group to 0.65 percent for the highest income
group.12 This ﬁnding is consistent with the various partial equilibrium uses side studies discussed
in section 2.
Finally, the average burden of carbon pricing arising from sources side effects is progressive.
Now the burden ranges from 0.36 percent of income for the lowest decile to 0.70 percent for the
highest income groups. The sources side progressivity is sufﬁciently strong to completely offset
the uses side regressivity.
What drives this surprising result? First, rental returns fall relative to wages. Since capital
income is a particularly large share of income for high income households, the relative factor
income shares disproportionately impact high income households. It should be noted that this
model is a closed economy model. If carbon pricing were introduced in the United States in the
context of an open economy, the capital income effects would no doubt be moderated. But
leakage would also affect results on both the sources and uses side so one cannot predict the
distributional results. If carbon pricing were introduced, however, globally, then the results are
likely to still go through since capital cannot shift to economies that do not price carbon.
The second force at work driving this progressivity result is the ﬁxing of transfer income in
real terms. Transfer income is a particularly large share of income for low income households so
12 Note that all households are adversely affected since the carbon revenue is spent in ways that do not enter consumer
utility functions.
24this assumption is an important driver of our result. How government will in fact adjust transfer
payments if carbon pricing were introduced cannot be predicted. Fullerton et al. (2011) ﬁnd that
over 90 percent of transfer payments in the United States are explicitly indexed thereby providing
support for the approach we took in this paper.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper makes ﬁve key points. First, how proceeds of a carbon pricing policy are used
affects both the efﬁciency and equity of the policy. Using revenues to cut tax rates has beneﬁcial
efﬁciency consequences but comes at the cost of higher regressivity. On the other hand, certain
distributions have adverse consequences on both efﬁciency and equity. On these grounds, one
cannot ﬁnd an easy justiﬁcation for the free distribution of allowances in a cap and trade system to
industry. Of course, one can justify free distribution on political economy grounds. Our analysis
helps illustrate the cost of using a free distribution to effect political goals.
Second, previous policy analyses have been carried out using models with a single
representative agent or a small number of households. This analysis uses a model with a large
number of households and therefore provides ﬁner level detail on distributional impacts of various
policies. Doing so makes the point that variation in impacts within broad socioeconomic groups
may swamp average variation across groups.
Third, we provide two measures to proxy for lifetime income to address the criticism that
studies using annual income bias carbon pricing towards greater regressivity. We do not ﬁnd
evidence of such bias in this analysis but stress that our proxy measures are by no means perfect.
Fourth, interesting variation in burden impacts exists across racial and ethnic groups. Such
variation has not been pointed out in the literature before. Further work will be needed to
understand the causes and implications of this variation. But our initial analysis suggests that
much of the impact goes away once income and other household characteristics are controlled for.
Five, we note that sources side impacts of carbon pricing have typically been ignored in the
literature. Doing so biases distributional studies towards ﬁnding carbon pricing to be regressive.
We ﬁnd that progressivity on the sources side is sufﬁciently strong to offset regressivity on the
uses side so that carbon pricing is proportional.
Finally we note that advances in computing power and numerical techniques make solving
CGE models with large numbers of households quite tractable. This paper provides a brief look at
the possibilities for understanding differential impacts of policies across different socioeconomic
dimensions. We expect that this will provide a new area for research that should improve our
understanding of the distributional impacts of environmental and energy policies.
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28APPENDIXA: Appendix
This appendix describes the implementation of the decomposition algorithm that
endogenously integrates the 15,588 households within the general equilibrium model.
We begin by describing our speciﬁcation of household utility. Each household h = 1;:::;H is
faced with the problem of allocating his budget to a set of commodities, to maximize utility. Let
the quantities be denoted by qi, for i = 1;:::;I, corresponding to commodities with prices pi,
respectively. We assume that household utility is described by a utility tree whose structured in
depicted in Figure A1. The utility tree consists of N + 1 levels, n = 0;1;:::;N; on each level
we distinguish several utility components. At the highest level (indicated by n = N) of the utility
tree there is only one component, which corresponds to overall utility; this component is a
function of utility components at the next-lower level n = N   1. These utility components at
N   1 are in turn each a function of disjoint groups of utility components at the next lower level
N   2, and so on. Finally, the utility components at level n = 1 are functions of the the
elementary utility components.13
We specify the utility function by specifying the utility components (for simplicity we
suppress the region index). We assume that all the utility components are linear homogenous































where j 2 i is used to indicate the set of components qh
n 1;j associated with qh
n;i, and where h
n;i
denotes the elasticity of substitution between commodities j 2 i. Note that we write the nested
utility function in calibrated share form (Rutherford, 1995);  and  q denote the value share and
consumption in the benchmark equilibrium, respectively. Additionally, we assume that h
n;i  0,
0  h




Labor supply is determined by the household choice between leisure and labor. We calibrate
compensated and uncompensated labor supply elasticities following the approach described in
Ballard (2000), and assume for all households that the uncompensated (compensated) labor
supply elasticity is 0.1 (0.3). Savings enters directly into the utility function which generates the
demand for savings and makes the consumption-investment decision endogenous. Following
Paltsev et al. (2009) we assume CS = 0.
The decomposition algorithm is implemented by replacing in each region the household side
with a representative agent (RA) whose utility function exhibits the identical structure as
13 These are the sectoral outputs as labeled in the ﬁrst and second columns in Table 1, and leisure and savings demand
that enter in the two top nests of the utility tree.












; ~ n;i =
~ n;i   1
~ n;i
(2)
where upper case variables denote the respective counterparts for the RA to individual households
as deﬁned in (1). A key insight from Rausch and Rutherford (2010) is that the choice of ~ n;i is
entirely innocuous as this parameter bears no economic signiﬁcance for the behavior of “real”
households in the underlying economic model (it can, however, affect the convergence speed of
the iterative solution procedure).
Given benchmark data on observable household demand  qh
i and prices  pi, we initialize the RA
general equilibrium model such that commodity demands are consistent with the aggregate of









 pn;j  Qn;j P
j02i  pn;j0  Qn;j0
: (4)
Solving for a carbon policy shock involves ﬁrst solving the RA model to obtain a candidate vector
of general equilibrium prices pk. k denotes an iteration index. The second step solves a partial
equilibrium relaxation of the underlying economy by evaluating household demand functions
q
h;k
n;i (pk;yk), where household income yk is updated sequentially at prices in iteration k. The key





























Note that this iterative procedure never alters preferences of the “real” households; it simply
“re-benchmarks” successively the utility function of the artiﬁcial representative household to be
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Figure A1. Utility nesting.
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